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completion of this essay. 
Scientific medicine rightly and understandably depends upon 
making precise diagnoses . For each diagnosis, there is a name or labeL 
Labeling a person in the sense of identifying and categorizing a 
symptom or disease does not usually strike us as improper or unjust. 
But medical labels, despite their necessity and usefulness, may be 
unjustly as well as justly used. In this essay I want to examine certain 
injustices connected with the concept or label "mental retardation." 
In Ralph Potter's excellent essay, "Labeling the Mentally Retarded: 
The Just Allocation of Therapy," certain criteria were developed by 
which to judge the justice of the way in which labels are applied . 1 
Potter argued that the just use of labels in medicine for therapeutic 
purposes should satisfy the following three criteria. First, no label 
should be indelible. Any label that is applied to persons should be 
erasable. Second, labels should establish eligibility for special assist-
ance provided for persons with specific needs. This means that labels 
should expand opportunities for the persons to whom they are 
applied. Labels which contract opportunities constitute an ethically 
unjustified use of power over others. Potter's third criterion is that 
labels should confirm the treatment of persons as persons. In other 
words, when one identifies a weakness in a person, this should not 
prejudice one's expectations concerning the presence of a wide range 
of valuable human qualities in that person. Applying Potter's criteria is 
very revealing for seeing the differences and the actual practices sur-
rounding a diagnosis like appendicitis as compared to a diagnosis of 
mental retardation. 
Indelibility 
With respect to indelibility, appendicitis is not morally problematic. 
It is certainly a temporary label. Furthermore, there is no stigma 
attached to it, at least none that is permanent. Persons who are labeled 
mentally retarded, on the other hand, tend to carry this label through-
May, 1978 111 
out their lives, and almost always for a very long time. One indication 
of the expected irreversibility of mental retardation has been the 
strong tendency to wish to sterilize young, mentally retarded women. 
Although this tendency has abated, persons considered mentally 
retarded still risk being sterilized with or without their consent. 
Persons who have at some point in their lives been designated as 
mentally retarded have great difficulty in shaking off this label. Even 
the most loving and well-intentioned persons will often marvel at what 
a retarded person can accomplish rather than think about the fact that 
certain accomplishments on the part of a person once thought of as 
mentally retarded should lead to the withdrawal of the label of mental 
retardation. This persistence in using the label of mental retardation 
for persons who are doing many of the things taken for granted of 
"normals" is extremely unfair. 
Special Assistance 
When a person is diagnosed by a duly licensed physician as having 
appendicitis, one can usually expect that such a person will receive 
subsequent care and the removal of the symptoms associated with the 
label. All of us are aware , of course, that there are potential and actual 
injustices that may be associated with someone who is said to have 
appendicitis. Unnecessary operations and discrimination in the deliv-
ery of health care are examples of problems of justice that the larger 
society must constantly struggle to rectify. Nonetheless, our point 
here is that the label of appendicitis as such is not a source of abuse. 
By itself, then, being told that one has appenoicitis does not involve 
a contraction of any basic human rights. On balance, it is a great gain 
to be diagnosed as having appendicitis when one indeed is suffering 
from it, because it means that one's right to live and pursue happiness 
will have been enhanced by speedy, therapeutic intervention . 
Special assistance in the case of mental retardation is, at best, 
uneven. Indeed, it is not often possible to do something genuinely 
therapeutic. For example, an underlying condition of Down's syn-
drome, which includes mental retardation, is not something that is at 
the present time reversible. What is all too often overlooked, or at any 
rate inadequately dealt with, is the fact that the person who has 
Down's may, in many instances, still be helped to overcome some of 
the incapacities associated with mental retardation. Our record relative 
to providing special assistance for the mentally retarded is not at all on 
a par with our record relative to appendicitis. 
The worst aspect of the label of mental retardation is, however, the 
devastating extent to which persons bearing that label may lose their 
most fundamental rights. We have already alluded to sterilization, and 
the reader of this issue of the Linacre Quarterly can see in Richard 
Sherlock's essay a number of ways in which the mentally retarded 
have not been afforded their full rights as human beings by court 
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decisions. Harold Vanderpool's essay in this same issue calls attention 
to a whole system of thought and orientation which is being applied 
toward retarded individuals in various institutions for the retarded on 
the basis of B. F. Skinner's ethical reasoning. Calling persons retarded 
permits Skinner to speak of them as a detriment to the struggle for the 
survival of the human species. He thinks that retarded persons are 
virtually of no worth to the human species unless they are used in 
experiments that will teach us how better to survive. Those who have 
read the articles by Shaw2 and by Duff and Carnpbell 3 will know also 
that newly-born infants who are considered to be mentally retarded 
may, with the cooperation of parents, lose the usual right to receive 
life-saving medical interventions. In short, to be labeled mentally 
retarded may, in some instances, mean the loss of so fundamental a 
right as the right to life. Clearly, mental retardation carries with it 
associations that appendicitis never does. 
Treating Persons as Persons 
Again, appendicitis is not a problem with respect to losing one's 
identity and dignity as a person. In fact, it is an excellent label in this 
regard because it functions precisely to relieve people temporarily of 
their usual responsibilities and to hold them guiltless with respect to 
any loss of productivity or inconveniences entailed by their medical 
condition. The effect of being ill with appendicitis, as with many 
other cases of illness, is to be given special deference as a person. 
Mental retardation poses a real threat to persons. Actually it poses 
the ultimate threat. Persons so designated may not be regarded as 
persons at all. Joseph Fletcher has written that a Down's is not a 
person. 4 In subsequent pUblications he has spelled out specific criteria 
of personhood which include the achievement of a certain IQ leve1. 5 If 
mental retardation is to connote a complete lack of personhood, it not 
only loses whatever therapeutic value it still retains, but it also 
becomes a sentence of death, or at the very least, a sentence to sec-
ond-class citizenship. 
There may be some question in the minds of readers about the 
comparability of appendicitis and mental retardation as medical labels. 
After all, appendicitis is clearly an acute condition and mental retarda-
tion is often associated with conditions such as Down's syndrome 
which are irreversible or chronic. This is true. However, justice in the 
use of mental retardation as a medical diagnosis and label requires us 
to be guided by two important additional facts: first, that a great 
number of mentally handicapped individuals can be helped to improve 
their level of performance and functioning, and second, that some 
individuals who have been described as mentally retarded will achieve 
a state of independence that makes it inappropriate and unnecessary 
to continue calling them retarded. Indeed, what we are contending is 
that it is not just to label persons mentally retarded if the use of the 
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label does not serve to provide them with help , and if the label is not 
erased even though the condition that justified its use has been 
improved to the point where help is no longer needed. 
Having contrasted appendicitis and mental retardation as diagnostic 
labels, some of the readers may understandably ask about other diag-
nostic labels that may involve injustices. Physicians, for example, have 
long been uneasy about the extent to which and the way in which 
diagnoses of cancer or of heart disease are to be communicated to 
persons with the relevant medical symptoms. Our purpose here in 
introducing criteria for judging the just use of diagnostic labels is to 
provide a reminder to those who use medical labels of their potential 
for abuse and a way of identifying what constitutes abuse in labeling. 
There is no attempt here to argue that people who have symptoms 
associated with what is called mental retardation will be greatly helped 
if other words are substituted for their particular condition or handi-
cap. No, this essay is not about what words or diagnostic labels to use, 
but rather has to do with identifying and illustrating criteria by which 
abuses in applying diagnostic labels can be identified and hopefully 
curbed. It is a plea for more justice for those who are considered 
mentally retarded. 
Perhaps a further word is in order about the basis we have for 
thinking about even the most severely retarded human beings as per-
sons. There are at least three ways in which people decide questions of 
personhood: 1) utilitarian, 2) rationalistic, and 3) Good Samaritan. 
The utilitarian ideal of personhood would decide that human beings 
qualify as persons depending upon how useful or productive they 
are. Sometimes this will include the usefulness that is associated with 
even limited forms of expressing affection, but sometimes it does not. 
In The Gulag Archipelago, Solzhenitsyn devastatingly documents the 
complete loss of human rights and personhood that were associated 
with the seemingly simple and innocent formula of the earliest chief 
prosecutor of this new Soviet-socialist government. For Krylenko, 
justice was decided on the basis of what was expedient for the state. 
Krylenko also used the argument that is part of the basic utilitarian 
formula, namely, the greatest good for the greatest number. The deci-
sions of the court were always made in the name of the masses, of the 
great majority. But no basic human rights are secure under this for-
mula. If the rights to life and liberty are not strictly equal, justice has 
been undermined. And fairness, whether in the courts or in medicine, 
will not be the norm. 
People may have a rationalistic ideal of personhood. Socrates is 
reputed to have said that the unexamined life is not worth living. John 
Stuart Mill thought it better to be a Socrates dissatisfied than an 
animal satisfied. In both these instances, the basic right to life seems 
to be questioned in instances where a certain measure of intellectual 
attainment is impossible or not forthcoming. In any event, a certain 
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intolerance for imperfection of the intellect is a long-standing part of 
Western tradition and a basis on which some human beings are judged 
as to their worthiness to be designated as persons and treated 
accordingly. 
If every member of society and everyone born into the human 
species is to enjoy an equal right to life and liberty, nothing less than 
the Good Samaritan ideal of personhood will be necessary. What this 
ideal requires is that the community be pledged to a constraint against 
killing, the exceptions to which cannot be justified on the basis of 
criteria of personhood based on utility, reason, or other considerations 
of merit. To be conceived and to be born of human parents is suf-
ficient reason to be afforded the usual care and solicitousness which 
we constantly bestow upon persons. There may be many difficult 
decisions and conflicts that arise from the satisfaction of our basic 
human rights, but our resolution of these will be unjust if it is based 
on considerations of usefulness or rational ability. 
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